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General managerial skills and corporate social responsibility 
 
Abstract 
We show that a CEO’s general managerial skills are negatively related to the level of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) undertaken by the firm. This finding is robust to alternative 
measures of CSR and alternative econometric specifications. The negative effect of general 
managerial skills on CSR persists when we attempt to address potential endogeneity concerns 
by employing propensity score matching and an instrumental variables approach. Further, 
supplementary analysis reveals that this negative effect is stronger in tight labor markets and 
in firms where shareholders are more short term oriented, consistent with the notion that the 
broader set of outside options available to generalist chief executive officers acts as a labor 
market mechanism that makes them less concerned about the firm’s long-term prosperity and 
thus more reluctant to commit to CSR. 
 
 
JEL classification: G32; G34; J24; M14 









Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to management’s obligation to make decisions 
beyond legal requirements that are desirable in terms of society’s values and objectives 
(Mosley et al., 1996). The literature suggests that the establishment of a CSR strategy that 
integrates social, environmental, ethical, and consumer concerns into business operations has 
become a crucial component of a firm’s long-term sustainability and competiveness 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012; 
Ferrell et al., 2016; Liang and Renneboog, 2017). Thus, understanding the factors that 
determine a firm’s commitment to CSR activity is clearly valuable and pertinent to both 
academics and practitioners. Several recent studies show that heterogeneity in CEO 
characteristics or personal traits such as altruism, confidence, and materialism matter for 
corporate policies related to CSR (Borghesi et al., 2014; Davidson et al., 2016; McCarthy et 
al., 2017). In this paper, we extend this line of inquiry by examining whether the composition 
of a CEO’s managerial skills affects the level of CSR undertaken by the firm. 
Becker’s (1962) seminal work on human capital theory distinguished between two types 
of managerial skills, including general skills, which are transferrable across firms or industries, 
and firm-specific skills, which are valuable only within an organization. Since then, a vast 
literature on the role and influence of managerial skills has demonstrated that the increased 
importance of general skills relative to firm-specific skills results in higher pay for generalist 
CEOs—that is, CEOs with more general managerial skills (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007; 
Custódio et al., 2013)—and that firms run by generalist CEOs exhibit higher risk (May, 1995), 
increased corporate innovation (Custódio et al., 2017), higher costs of equity (Mishra, 2014), 
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and improved investment efficiency (Xuan, 2009). Our focus is whether firms with generalist 
CEOs undertake more or less CSR activity.1 
Generalist CEOs can move across firms and industries more easily, given their more 
diverse professional skills and experience compared to CEOs with focused business experience. 
Thus, the broader set of outside options available to generalist CEOs makes their long-term 
wealth less contingent on the future prosperity of the firm (Mishra, 2014). In turn, the reduced 
contingency could provide generalist CEOs with incentives to engage in projects with near-
term payoffs and dislike those with long-term payoffs. We therefore expect that generalist 
CEOs are less likely to engage in CSR activity because CSR is highly intangible, with valuation 
difficulties (Deng et al., 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Edmans, 2011). Additionally, CSR typically 
requires the slow, time-consuming process of improving firm–stakeholder relationships and 
the financial returns are thus not immediate, if any (Zadek, 2004; Deckop et al., 2006; Kang, 
2016). 
We use the variable General Ability Index, or GAI, developed by Custódio et al. (2013), 
to measure general managerial skills. The index incorporates five aspects of a CEO’s lifetime 
career experience, including the past number of (i) positions, (ii) firms, and (iii) industries in 
which the CEO worked; (iv) whether the CEO has held a CEO position at a different company; 
and (v) whether the CEO has worked for a conglomerate firm. Following previous literature 
 
1 Examples of general human capital are economics, management science, accounting, and finance expertise, which are 
applicable across organizations or industries. Examples of firm-specific human capital include knowledge about or connections 
with product markets, suppliers, and clients, which are specific to a given organization or industry. A similar concept is labor 
mobility of various occupations. Certainly, some occupations are more mobile than others. The labor mobility of an occupation 
depends on its skill requirements. The more general (firm-specific) the required skills are, the more (less) mobile the occupation 
is. For example, travel agents are relatively less mobile than accounting clerks because the former occupation requires 
relatively less general skills, whereas the latter requires less firm-specific skills. Custódio et al. (2013) propose an indirect 
measure of general managerial ability based on past work experience. The intuition behind this measure is that a CEO who 
worked in different organizational areas, for multiple firms, in different industries, or in a conglomerate firm, or who has served 
as CEO previously would have more general skills, either due to self-selection or as a result of learning, and in turn more 
outside options. We conjecture that generalist CEOs are likely to be short-term orientated and less concerned about the firm’s 
long-term prosperity and CSR. One prominent case in point is Kenneth Lay, who was the founder, CEO and Chairman of 
Enron and was heavily involved in the Enron scandal, a major accounting scandal that unraveled in 2000. On the other hand, 
he served in numerous positions, firms, and industries and has a GAI of 4.303 as of 2000, compared to the sample mean of 
0.043, indicating high general managerial ability. Another example is Dennis Kozlowski (a GAI of 3.586 as of 2002), a former 
CEO of Tyco International Ltd. In 2002, he was charged with, and later convicted of, $600 million fraud scheme. 
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(Deng et al., 2013; Lins et al., 2017), we use the modified CSR score to measure firm CSR 
performance using data obtained from the database of Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD). 
Consistent with our prediction, we find a negative and statistically significant relation between 
the general ability index and the CSR score. Specifically, our baseline regression results 
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the general ability index is associated with a 
0.034 decrease in the CSR score, or a 16.17% drop from the mean. This finding is robust to 
alternative measures of CSR, different empirical specifications, and alternative clustering. 
While the baseline results are robust and consistent with our hypothesis, the estimated 
negative relation between general managerial skills and CSR could be spurious. For instance, 
there could always be some unobserved factors influencing both the presence of a generalist 
CEO and the firm’s CSR strategy. It could also be the case that firms with more socially 
responsible investments are less likely to appoint generalist CEOs if CSR performance is fueled 
largely by firm-specific skills that generalists lack. We adopt two identification strategies to 
address endogeneity concerns and help establish causality. Our first strategy is to use 
propensity score matching to compare firms with generalist CEOs to otherwise 
indistinguishable firms with specialist CEOs. Generalist CEOs are CEOs with a general ability 
index above the yearly median and those with an index below the yearly median are specialists. 
The results suggest a significant difference in the level of CSR between the two groups. Firms 
with generalist CEOs undertake significantly less CSR activity than the matched control group 
with specialist CEOs, confirming the baseline results. 
Our second identification strategy is to employ the instrumental variables (IV) approach. 
As a source of exogenous variation in general managerial skills, we use the variable Recession 
depth to exploit differences in labor market conditions at the beginning of a CEO’s career. This 
variable is defined as the depth of the recession if there was a recession in the year a CEO’s 
career started and zero otherwise, where a recession’s depth is the number of months it lasted. 
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We use Recession depth instead of just a dummy for whether there was a recession because the 
severity of a recession could capture additional heterogeneity in the CEO’s career progression 
and a resulting skill set that is not explained by the recession year dummy. Moreover, we follow 
the approach of Schoar and Zuo (2017) and look at the expected starting year by using a 
person’s birth year plus 24 (i.e., the modal age for starting one’s first position in their sample). 
A potential concern with using the actual starting year is that individuals could delay entering 
the job market during a recession, resulting in endogenously determined labor market entry. 
Instead, we focus on the expected starting year, which corresponds to when CEOs would likely 
have started their careers had endogenous choices in timing their labor market entry not taken 
place. 
This identification strategy exploits the fact that economic conditions when CEOs start 
their first job have a significant impact on their subsequent career development and, in turn, 
managerial skills gathered through their lifetime work experience. Specifically, Schoar and 
Zuo (2017) document that CEOs who started their careers during recessions have less mobility 
across industries and firms and hold fewer positions before first becoming CEO. In other words, 
such CEOs could have fewer opportunities to develop general managerial skills compared to 
those who started in non-recession years. 
On the other hand, the economic conditions in a CEO’s expected year of entry into the 
labor market is plausibly exogenous to the CEO’s career choices, since a person’s birth date is 
largely exogenous to that person’s life. Obviously, CEOs who started their careers in a 
recession year could differ systematically from CEOs who started in a normal year, but we 
assume that recession and non-recession CEOs do not differ in their attitudes toward CSR 
activity for reasons other than differential career histories, a key component of the General 
Ability Index. Consistent with this view, Schoar and Zuo (2017) find suggestive evidence that 
there are no significant differences in observable backgrounds between recession and non-
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recession CEOs (e.g., their educational attainment and the quality of the schools they attended), 
which we confirm using our data. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that, in the absence of a 
natural experiment, it is never possible to completely rule out remaining unobservable 
characteristics that can influence our results. Overall, we find, as expected, that Recession depth 
is negatively and significantly correlated with the general ability index. In addition, second-
stage regression results confirm the negative impact of general managerial skills on CSR. 
In supplementary tests, we exploit the difference in the value of outside options between 
generalist and specialist CEOs. To capture the variation in the value of outside options, we use 
a measure of the tightness of the local labor market following Custódio et al. (2017) and Kedia 
and Rajgopal (2009). The tighter the labor market, the stronger the demand for workers and 
managerial talent and the higher the likelihood of CEOs receiving outside job offers from other 
firms in the region. Moreover, generalist CEOs should benefit more than specialist CEOs in 
tight labor markets because they have more transferable skills and are more likely to capitalize 
on a favorable job market. Consistent with this view, we find suggestive evidence that the 
negative relation between the general ability index and CSR is more prominent in tight labor 
markets. Finally, we find that the negative effect of general managerial skills on CSR is greater 
for firms whose shareholders are more short term oriented, consistent with the notion that 
generalist CEOs are more concerned about labor market evaluation, which is driven largely by 
current performance. 
Our study complements previous literature on the role of the CEO in fostering CSR 
activity. Existing findings demonstrate that CSR is related to various CEO characteristics, such 
as CEO confidence (Tang et al., 2015; McCarthy et al., 2017), CEO age (Oh et al., 2016), 
monetary and nonmonetary incentives (Fabrizi et al., 2014), and the CEO’s parenting 
experience (Cronqvist and Yu, 2017). We show that a firm’s CSR activity can be significantly 
altered by its CEO’s general human capital. Further, our findings contribute to a better 
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understanding of how the composition of a CEO’s managerial skills influences the CEO’s 
incentives and decision making. Custódio et al. (2017) argue that the broader set of outside 
options available to generalist CEOs acts as a labor market mechanism that increases their 
tolerance for failure, which in turn promotes innovation. Our findings suggest that this labor 
market mechanism could also make a CEO’s long-term wealth less contingent on the future 
prosperity of the firm, rendering CSR activity less appealing from a generalist CEO’s 
perspective. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the data, sample selection, and summary statistics. Section 4 
discusses the main results along with endogeneity issues. Section 5 presents further analysis 
results. Section 6 tests the robustness of our findings and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related literature 
2.1 Managerial incentive and labor market evaluation 
A growing body of research provides evidence that the labor market uses firm performance as 
an indicator of managerial ability and that there is a positive relation between firm performance 
and labor market rewards for managers. For example, Gilson (1990) and Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990) find that managers from superior-performing firms are more likely to receive additional 
directorship positions, suggesting that superior performance increases the demand for a 
manager’s services. Fee and Hadlock (2003) examine executives who switch employers and 
find that above-average stock price performance increases the likelihood of an executive 
moving to a CEO position at another firm. This finding is consistent with the view that superior 
firm performance improves an executive’s external labor market opportunities. Another insight 
from this strand of literature concerns the issue of timing: firm performance during the last 
years before entering the external labor market more critically determines an executive’s value 
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in the labor market than that of more distant years. Using samples of retired CEOs, Brickley et 
al. (1999) and Evans et al. (2010) show that firm performance in the last two years of a CEO’s 
tenure is much stronger than firm performance in the last three to four years at predicting a 
CEO’s directorships after retirement. 
Given the decisive impact of current firm performance on their prospects in the labor 
market, managers who are more concerned about labor market evaluation could have stronger 
incentives to commit firm resources to short-term-oriented projects and minimize commitment 
to long-term-oriented projects or to those that are hard to value (Holmstrom and Costa, 1986; 
Stein, 1989; Bebchuk and Stole, 1993; Goel and Thakor, 2008). In addition, Narayanan (1985) 
argues theoretically that, given the competitive nature of the labor market, managers could 
make decisions that yield short-term profits at the expense of the firm’s long-term interests to 
improve perceptions about their ability early and hence earn higher wages. Relatedly, a number 
of studies document that managers under takeover threat could forsake good investments to 
boost current earnings (Stein, 1989), whereas those with long-term contracts are less likely to 
behave myopically and more likely to commit resources to enhance firm reputation over the 
long run compared to those with short-term contracts (Whetten and Mackey, 2002; Cziraki and 
Xu, 2017). 
 
2.2 Generalist CEOs and CSR 
Custódio et al. (2013) define generalist CEOs as those CEOs who are richly endowed with 
general managerial skills acquired through their lifetime work experience, as opposed to 
specialist CEOs, who are characterized by firm- or industry-specific skills. Unlike specific 
managerial skills that are highly valuable primarily within a particular firm or industry, general 
managerial skills are readily transferable across entities and sectors. Thus, generalist CEOs 
with a broader set of outside options are more likely to engage in job hopping to capitalize on 
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a favorable job market (Giannetti, 2011). Consistent with this logic, prior studies show that 
generalist CEOs are frequently approached by executive search consultants and have an easier 
time finding and obtaining offers from other comparable firms (Dasgupta and Ding, 2010; 
Giannetti, 2011; Mishra, 2014). Therefore, the long-term wealth of a generalist CEO is less 
contingent on the firm’s future prosperity than that of a specialist CEO. The reduced 
contingency could have a significant impact on corporate decisions, since CEOs with general 
managerial skills have incentives to engage in projects with near-term payoffs to inflate current 
performance and dislike projects with long-term payoffs even though these could enhance the 
firm’s longevity or sustainability. In contrast, CEOs with focused professional experience and 
skill sets are more likely to choose internal operations that involve interactions with clients, 
suppliers, and employees as their strategic priority (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007; Lazear, 2009; 
Custódio et al., 2013). 
Given the interaction between labor market evaluation and executive skill sets and 
resulting managerial incentive problems, we expect generalist CEOs to be less likely to invest 
in CSR due to the following features of CSR activity. First, the empirical evidence on the link 
between CSR and firm performance is largely ambiguous, rendering the performance 
implications of CSR unclear (for a review¸ see Ferrell et al., 2016). A strand of research argues 
that CSR activity is a time-consuming process that improves firm-stakeholder relationships and 
thereby contributes to firm performance in the long run (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004; Brammer and Millington, 2008; Godfrey et al., 2009; 
Kacperczyk, 2009; Deng et al., 2013). However, the financial benefit of CSR is clouded by the 
view that CSR represents primarily a practice that deviates from profit maximization, which 
could result in a misallocation of resources and impairment of shareholder wealth (Thomas and 
Ely, 1996; Ogden and Watson, 1999; Zadek, 2004; Deckop et al., 2006; Kang, 2016). For 
instance, Kruger (2015) examines stock market reactions to CSR event announcements and 
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shows that the stock market has a strong negative reaction to negative CSR events and a weak 
negative reaction to positive CSR events, suggesting that CSR and firm performance, 
especially in the short term, might not go hand in hand. 
Second, the intangible and sometimes invisible nature of CSR activity means that it is 
difficult to measure CSR in terms of either its input or output values. One implication of this 
intangibility is that the stock market might not fully value a firm’s CSR activity. Indeed, much 
of the prior literature argues that intangibles such as CSR are not fully incorporated because 
the market lacks information on their value (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan et al., 2001; Lev, 
2004). Even if such information were available, the market might ignore it if it were not salient, 
given ambiguous predictions on whether CSR enhances firm performance. Another 
explanation of non-incorporation is that investors use traditional valuation methodologies 
devised for firms comprised mainly of physical assets, which cannot easily incorporate 
intangibles (Deng et al., 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Edmans, 2011). 
Taken together, generalist CEOs have greater bargaining power in the labor market and 
can move across firms and industries more easily than specialist CEOs, given their diverse 
career experience and general human capital. Moreover, generalist CEOs might pay close 
attention to labor market evaluation and are more likely to engage in job hopping to capitalize 
on a favorable job market. Their long-term wealth thus becomes less contingent on the firm’s 
future prosperity, which, in turn, induces them to reduce the level of firm commitment to long-
term investment projects and be more concerned about short-term performance. Considering 
that the financial return from CSR activity is not immediate and requires the slow, time-
consuming process of reputation development and firm-stakeholder relationship improvement, 




3. Data and summary statistics 
3.1 Data 
We start with the corporate social responsibility rating data obtained from the KLD database 
over the period from 1996 to 2012.2 To examine the effect of general managerial skills on CSR, 
we then merge the corporate social responsibility rating data with the general managerial ability 
index data provided by Custódio et al. (2013).3 The latter data cover the period only until 2007. 
We therefore supplement this information with our hand-collected data to include the period 
from 2008 to 2012. Specifically, for our sample between 1996 and 2007, we use the original 
general ability index data from Custódio et al. (2013). For the extended period of 2008 to 2012, 
we construct the general ability index ourselves following the methodology in Custódio et al. 
(2013).4 
Moreover, firm-level financial data are obtained from the CRSP-Compustat Merged 
Database, corporate governance and director characteristics data are from RiskMetrics, and 
institutional investor data are from CDA/Spectrum 13F filings. We consider also a number of 
CEO characteristics including educational attainment and past experience, which have been 
collected from BoardEx, Bloomberg, and LinkedIn, using procedures and definitions following 
the existing literature (Bhagat et al., 2010; Cronqvist et al., 2012; and Benmelech and Frydman, 
2015). Our final sample consists of 10,750 firm-year observations, representing 1,769 unique 
firms and 2,744 unique CEOs between 1996 and 2012. 
 
 
2 We start our sample in 1996 due to the availability of director characteristics information in RiskMetrics and we end the 
sample in 2012 because we do not have sufficient information on the seven components (i.e., community, corporate governance, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product quality) needed for calculating the overall CSR score 
after 2012.  
3 We thank Pedro Matos for kindly providing the general ability index data.  
4 This extended sample consists of the index values for CEOs already exist in the 1996-2007 sample plus those of new CEOs 
who became CEO for the first time between 2008 and 2012. 
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3.2 Variable construction 
KLD divides a firm’s CSR-related information into seven categories, including community, 
corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product 
quality. Each category contains several dimensions with positive (i.e., strength) and negative 
(i.e., concern) indicators. Each strength or concern is assigned the value of one if it meets the 
criteria. Similar to Deng et al. (2013) and Lins et al. (2017), we construct the modified CSR 
measure in three steps. First, we divide the strength and concern scores for each category by 
the number of strength and concern indicators in that category, respectively, to obtain modified 
scores. Second, we derive the net score for each category by subtracting the modified concern 
score from the modified strength score. Finally, we aggregate individual scores to form an 
overall CSR score.5 
Our measure of general managerial skills is the general ability index developed by 
Custódio et al. (2013). The value of the index for CEO i in year t is calculated based on the 
following model: 
 𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 0.268𝑋1𝑖,𝑡 + 0.312𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 + 0.309𝑋3𝑖,𝑡 + 0.218𝑋4𝑖,𝑡 + 0.153𝑋5𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
where X1 is the number of positions the CEO held during his or her career, X2 is the number 
of firms where a CEO worked, X3 is the number of industries at the four-digit SIC level in 
which a CEO worked, X4 is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO held a CEO position 
at another firm, and X5 is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO worked for a multi-
division firm. The index is the first factor of a principal components analysis of the five proxies. 
A higher value of the index indicates greater general managerial ability. As in Custódio et al. 
(2013, 2017), the index is standardized to have a zero mean and a unit standard deviation. 
 
5 For example, the KLD CSR strength and concern scores of the seven categories for Starbucks in 2003 are 2, 0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0 
and 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, respectively. The corresponding numbers of strength and concern indicators are 6, 4, 8, 6, 5, 3, 4 and 4, 
3, 3, 5, 7, 4, 4. Thus, the modified strength and concern scores can be calculated as 0.7916 (= 2/6 + 0/4 + 1/8 + 2/6 + 0/5 + 0/3 
+ 0/4) and 0.5333 (=0/4 + 1/3 + 0/3 + 1/5 + 0/7 + 0/4 + 0/4), respectively. Finally, the overall CSR score for Starbucks in 2003 
is 0.2583 (= 0.7916 - 0.5333). 
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Motivated by the previous CSR literature (e.g., Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Godfrey et al., 
2009; Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Manner, 2010; Borghesi et al., 2014; Rao and Tilt, 2016), we 
include a wide range of controls for CEO, firm, and governance characteristics. First, we 
include controls for CEO characteristics, including CEO gender, CEO duality, CEO MBA, 
CEO Ivy league,6 CEO military, CEO age, CEO tenure, and CEO fast track to capture other 
CEO characteristics that may influence the level of CSR. In addition, we include Size, ROA, 
Stock return, Leverage, Tobin’s Q, Asset tangibility, and Firm age to account for firm 
characteristics that could potentially affect the level of CSR. Finally, we include Board 
independence, Board busyness, and Institutional holdings to capture the potential effect of 
corporate governance on CSR. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Throughout our analysis, the explanatory variables are lagged one year relative to the 
dependent variable to alleviate potential endogeneity problems. All accounting variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our baseline regression models. 
The average CEO is 55 years old and has a tenure of eight years and a general ability index 
score of 0.043. Further, 1.9% of the CEOs in the sample are female, 66.4% of them also chair 
the board, 33.2% have an MBA, 18.8% attended an Ivy League university, and 6.9% have 
military experience. The average age when our sample CEOs became a CEO for the first time 
is 46. An average firm in our sample has a CSR rating score of -0.213, a sales revenue of 
$6.388 billion, a return on assets of 13.7%, a stock return of 13.5%, a leverage of 0.213, a 
 
6  We collect as much education information as thoroughly and systematically as possible. We start with the education 
information disclosed in BoardEx. The disclosures about education in BoardEx differ across CEOs in the sample. Some 
disclosures include specific information about school, type of degree, major and year. Others provide just the name of the 
school. We then supplement this information with data obtained from Bloomberg Executive Profile & Biography and LinkedIn. 
Finally, we delete 36 CEOs with no education information in any of the above sources. 
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Tobin’s Q of 1.946, a fraction of tangible assets of 26.9%, a firm age of approximately 27 years, 
a fraction of independent directors of 71.9%, a fraction of busy directors of 27.1%, and a 
fraction of institutional holdings of 76.2%. All these descriptive statistics are comparable to 
those reported by Deng et al. (2013), Custódio et al. (2013), Borghesi et al. (2014), Mishra 
(2014), Tang et al. (2015), and Hubbard et al. (2017). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel A of Table 2 compares the characteristics of firms run by generalist CEOs and 
those of firms run by specialist CEOs at the firm-year level. We classify observations with a 
general ability index above the yearly median as generalists and those with an index below the 
yearly median as specialists. On average, firms with generalist CEOs have lower CSR rating 
scores than those with specialist CEOs. Further, firms with generalist CEOs are bigger and 
older, have higher leverage, hold more tangible assets, have a more independent and busier 
board, and have more institutional holdings. Panel B compares the personal characteristics of 
generalist CEOs and those of specialist CEOs at the CEO level. For each of the 2744 unique 
CEOs, we calculate an average general ability index across all years in the sample.7 We then 
classify them into the generalist and specialist groups based on the median of the average 
general ability index. Similar to Custódio et al. (2013), we find that generalist CEOs tend to be 
older, to have a shorter tenure, to be more likely to hold a dual CEO-chair title, have an MBA, 
have an academic degree from an Ivy League university, or have a history of military service; 
and were approximately two years older when they became a CEO for the first time than the 
average specialist CEO was.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
7 Other personal characteristic variables are also aggregated to the CEO level (by taking averages over years) before conducting 
the univariate analysis. 
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4. Main results 
4.1 General managerial ability and CSR 
Panel A of Table 3 presents our baseline results on the relation between general managerial 
skills and CSR activity. In each regression, we include industry and year fixed effects to 
account for macroeconomic shocks in a specific industry in a given year. Column (1) shows 
that the coefficient of General Ability Index is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, 
suggesting that general managerial skills are negatively related to CSR. In terms of economic 
significance, the coefficient of General Ability Index in column (1) indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in General Ability Index is associated with a 0.034 decrease in the CSR score, 
or a 16.17% drop from the mean. Alternatively, we define the general ability variable as a 
dummy based on the sample median of General Ability Index on a yearly basis and use it to 
explain CSR. In column (2), we find that the coefficient of General Ability Index_dummy 
remains negative and significant at the 1% level. 
In Panel B, we estimate several other specifications for robustness.  First, in columns (1) 
and (2), we use firm fixed effects regressions to mitigate the concern that the results are driven 
by unobserved factors at the firm level. The coefficient on the general ability variable remains 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in both specifications, suggesting that firm-
specific time-invariant unobservables cannot explain our findings. Second, one possibility is 
that certain personality traits might influence both the CEOs’ career trajectory and their 
attitudes towards CSR. For example, sensation seeking CEOs, with a desire to pursue novel 
experiences by working in multiple firms and industries, may find CSR projects less interesting 
and creative. Alternatively, selfish CEOs focusing on enriching their resume might care less 
about the firm’s long term prosperity and in turn CSR. To address these potential confounding 
effects, we incorporate CEO fixed effects to account for any differences in personality traits 
between CEOs that are invariant throughout the sample period. We find in columns (3) and (4) 
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that the negative effect of general managerial ability on CSR is robust to using CEO fixed 
effects, suggesting CEO personality traits alone cannot explain our findings. Third, we use 
Fama-MacBeth regressions with Newey-West standard errors to examine the cross-sectional 
relationship between general managerial ability and CSR in columns (5) and (6). The results 
show that the coefficient on the general ability variable remains negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in both regressions, confirming the negative effect of general 
managerial ability on CSR. 
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
4.2 Endogeneity 
Our results so far indicate a negative relation between the CEO’s general managerial ability 
and the level of CSR. However, this finding could be biased due to endogenous matching 
between the firm and the CEO. For instance, firms with more socially responsible investments 
could place greater emphasis on maintaining good stakeholder relationships and are thus less 
likely to appoint managers with little firm-specific knowledge in dealing with stakeholders 
(Miller, 1991; Datta et al., 2002). We attempt to mitigate endogeneity concerns by adopting 
two identification strategies. Our first strategy is to use propensity score matching, whereby 
firm-years with generalist CEOs are matched with those with specialist CEOs that exhibit no 
significant differences in other observable characteristics. Our second strategy is to employ an 
instrumental variables approach to alleviate concerns relating to reverse causation and omitted 
factors. 
 
4.2.1 Propensity score matching estimates 
Table 4 compares the CSR of firms with generalist CEOs with that of firms with specialist 
CEOs that have been matched to the former using propensity score matching. We first estimate 
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a logit regression of whether a firm has a generalist CEO. The propensity score is then the 
probability estimated from the logit regression. We include the same set of controls as in the 
baseline regression shown in Table 3. The results presented in column (1) of Panel A of Table 
4 suggest that firms with generalist CEOs are larger. 
We then apply the nearest-neighbor method to ensure that firms with generalist CEOs 
(treatment group) are sufficiently similar to their matched firms with specialist CEOs (control 
group). Specifically, each firm with a generalist CEO is matched to a firm with a specialist 
CEO with the closest propensity score. If a firm in the control group is matched to more than 
one firm in the treatment group, only the pair with the smallest difference in propensity scores 
between the two firms is retained. 8  We further require that the maximum difference in 
propensity scores between the treatment and its matched control firms does not exceed 0.1% 
in absolute value.9 
We conduct two diagnostic tests to verify that the observations in the treatment and 
control groups are sufficiently indistinguishable in terms of observable characteristics. The first 
test involves re-estimating the logit model using the matched sample. The results are reported 
in column (2) in Panel A of Table 4. None of the coefficient estimates is statistically significant, 
indicating no distinguishable trends between the treatment and control groups. In addition, 
most of the coefficients in column (2) are smaller in magnitude than those in column (1), 
implying that the results are not merely an artifact of a decline in the number of degrees of 
freedom in the restricted sample. Further, the pseudo-R-squared value decreases from 0.118 in 
the pre-match sample to only 0.002 in the post-match sample. 
 
8 As a robustness check, we allow for control firms to be matched to multiple treatment firms. The results do not change 
qualitatively. 
9 Our results remain consistent when we increase the maximum permissible difference in propensity scores to 0.5% and 1.0% 
in absolute value.  
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The second test is to examine the difference in means for each observable characteristic 
between the treatment and matched control groups. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 
4. The observation that none of the differences is statistically significant confirms the findings 
in column (2) of Panel A. Overall, the diagnostic test results appear to suggest that propensity 
score matching removes observable differences other than the difference in CEO type between 
the treatment and control groups. Thus, it increases the likelihood that any difference in CSR 
between the two groups is due to the presence of generalist CEOs. Finally, Panel C presents 
the propensity score matching estimates. The results suggest that firms with generalist CEOs 
tend to have much lower CSR scores compared to otherwise indistinguishable firms with 
specialist CEOs. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
4.2.2 Instrumental variables approach 
We also employ an instrumental variables approach to extract the exogenous component of 
General Ability Index and use it to explain CSR. Our instrumental variable Recession depth 
exploits the variation in labor market conditions at the beginning of a CEO’s career. It is 
defined as the depth of the recession if there is a recession in the year when a CEO’s career 
starts and zero otherwise, where a recession’s depth is the number of months that it lasts. 
Recession periods are defined based on the business cycle dating database of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Specifically, to be classified as a recession year, the 
(calendar) year must either include the trough of a business cycle or fully fall into a recession 
period (excluding the peak of a business cycle). All remaining years are non-recession years. 
We use Recession depth instead of just a dummy for whether there is a recession because the 
severity of a recession could capture additional heterogeneity in the CEO’s career progression 
and a resulting skill set that is not explained by the recession year dummy. 
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To explore the economic conditions at the time of the CEO’s job market entry, we follow 
the approach of Schoar and Zuo (2017) and proxy for the exogenous starting year by using a 
person’s birth year plus 24 (i.e., the age at which managers are most likely to start their first 
full-time job). This approach helps purge the estimation bias resulting from the possibility that 
the actual starting year is endogenously determined. If the most well-informed, intelligent 
individuals postpone their entrance into the labor market during a recession while the average 
employee does not, then this phenomenon would represent a selection issue. Instead, we focus 
on the expected starting year, which corresponds to when CEOs would likely have started their 
careers if endogenous choices in timing their labor market entry had not taken place. 
Schoar and Zuo (2017) show that the economic conditions when CEOs first enter the 
labor market have significant effects on their career paths and, in turn, the managerial skills 
gathered through their work experience. Specifically, CEOs who started their careers during 
recessions have less mobility across industries and firms and hold fewer positions before first 
becoming CEO. Thus, such CEOs could have fewer opportunities to develop general 
managerial skills compared to those who started in other years, suggesting a negative relation 
between Recession depth and the acquisition of general managerial skills. On the other hand, 
the economic conditions in a CEO’s expected year of entry into the labor market lie outside the 
CEO’s control, since a person’s birth date is largely exogenous to his or her life. Thus, it is 
plausible that starting one’s career during a recession, as an exogenous formative event, does 
not directly affect the CEO’s decisions with respect to the current firm’s CSR activity, except 
through the composition of managerial skills (developed over the CEO’s past career experience) 
or the variables we control for. 
Column (1) of Table 5 presents the first-stage regression results where the dependent 
variable is General Ability Index. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient of Recession 
depth is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that CEOs who started 
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their careers during (severe) recessions have less general managerial skills. The reported F-
statistic is 18.48, which is larger than the conventional threshold for weak instruments. Column 
(2) shows the second-stage regression results, where the dependent variable is the CSR rating. 
The main variable of interest is the predicted value of General Ability Index. Its coefficient 
remains negative and significant at the 5% level, which is reassuring. CEOs with more general 
managerial skills invest less in CSR, after endogeneity is mitigated, confirming our baseline 
results. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
A key identifying assumption for the instrumental variables approach is that our 
instrument, Recession depth, is uncorrelated with CSR except through the control variables 
included in the regression (i.e., the exclusion condition). While it is never possible to 
completely rule out violations of this condition, we can explore whether the data are consistent 
with particular violations. One potential concern here is that CEOs who have prior recession 
experience (following their CEO appointment) may behave differently than other CEOs (Blank 
and Hadley, 2018). In particular, living through hardship in the past could make a person more 
compassionate, care more about others, and thus more willing to engage in CSR projects, 
suggesting a link between recession experience and CSR orientation. To address this possibility, 
we construct a more direct measure of managerial prior recession experience, Recession CEO, 
an indicator variable taking a value of one if the CEO has previously experienced a recession 
during his or her CEO tenure and, zero otherwise. We then use this variable to explain the 
firm’s CSR scores in subsequent one to three years, respectively, including the same set of 
controls as the baseline model. The results (unreported) show that the coefficient on Recession 
CEO is statistically insignificant across all specifications. We therefore do not find evidence 




5. Further analysis 
5.1 Effect of outside options 
Our results so far are consistent with the notion that generalist CEOs undertake less CSR 
activity. In this section, we examine whether the negative relation between the general ability 
index and the level of CSR is affected by the value of the CEO’s outside options. Following 
Custódio et al. (2017) and Kedia and Rajgopal (2009), we use the tightness of the local labor 
market (as a measure of labor market conditions) to capture the variation in the value of outside 
options. The tighter the labor market, the stronger the demand for workers, as well as 
managerial talent, and the higher the likelihood that CEOs receive outside job offers from other 
firms in the region.10 Given that generalist CEOs have more transferable skills and are more 
likely to capitalize on a favorable job market, they should benefit more than specialist CEOs 
in tight labor markets. We therefore expect the relation between the general ability index and 
CSR activity to be more prominent in tight labor markets. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
In Table 6, we estimate the effect of General Ability Index on CSR separately for 
subsamples in labor markets with high and low levels of tightness. We split the sample into 
high- and low-tightness groups based on state-level unemployment rates.11 A state is in the 
high-tightness (low-tightness) group if it has an unemployment rate that is below (above) the 
sample median across all states in a given year. The regressions include the same controls as 
in previous tables. We find suggestive evidence that the effect of general managerial skills on 
 
10 The presumption in this analysis is that the managerial labor market is geographically segmented. Indeed, on the demand 
side, firms may hire locally to reduce search costs, to have better access to soft information about local candidates, or to enjoy 
private benefits from hiring local candidates. On the supply side, executives may want to work for local firms because they 
prefer living and working close to home, or because they possess valuable geographic-specific skills (Knyazeva et al., 2013; 
Yonker, 2017). Empirically, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) and Bouwman (2011) document that CEOs are more likely to hold 
outside directorships at nearby firms. Further, Yonker (2017) provides evidence that the local hiring bias also exists in CEO 
appointments. He finds that firms are over five times more likely to hire a local CEO than would be expected if geography 
were irrelevant to the hiring process. 
11 The unemployment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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CSR is greater in tight labor markets, where better outside options make generalist CEOs more 
reluctant to invest in CSR. 
 
5.2 Effect of the investor horizon 
If generalist CEOs are more concerned about labor market evaluation and if recent performance 
more critically determines their value in the labor market than performance in the distant past, 
we would expect the negative relation between General Ability Index and CSR to be stronger 
when the firm’s shareholders are more short term oriented. To test this conjecture, we use 
Investor turnover to capture the length of the investment horizon of shareholders, following 
the approach of Gaspar et al. (2005). This measure exploits the fact that short-term investors 
buy and sell their investments more frequently and hold their portfolios unchanged for shorter 
periods than long-term investors. Specifically, the value of Investor turnover for a firm is the 
average turnover of its investors’ entire portfolios, with higher values indicating shorter 
horizons.12 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 shows the split-sample analysis results based on the estimated investor turnover. 
A firm is in the high-turnover (low-turnover) group if its estimated average turnover is above 
(below) the sample median of Investor turnover. Estimating the effect of General Ability Index 
separately for the subsamples of high- and low-turnover firms, we find that the effect of general 
 
12 Using investor-level portfolio information obtained from CDA/Spectrum, we first calculate the so-called churn rate of 
investor i with a set of companies Q in his portfolio in quarter t: 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ |𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1ΔP𝑗,𝑡|𝑗∈𝑄 ∑ 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑗,𝑡−12𝑗∈𝑄  
where 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 are the price and number of shares, respectively, of firm j held by institutional investor i in quarter t. We 
then use the estimated churn rates to construct the investor horizon measure. Specifically, the Investor turnover value of firm 
k is the weighted average of the total portfolio churn rates of its investors over four quarters: 
Investor turnover of firm k = ∑ 𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 (14 ∑ 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑟+14𝑟=1 )𝑖∈𝑆  
where S denotes the set of institutional investors in firm k and 𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is the weight of investor i in the total percentage held by 
institutional investors in quarter t.  
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managerial skills on CSR is concentrated among firms held by short-term investors, consistent 
with our prediction. 
 
6. Robustness tests 
In this section, we perform several robustness checks of our main findings. First, in Panel A of 
Table 8, we examine the effect on the change in CSR rating when a firm switches CEO type 
from generalist to specialist or vice versa. CEOs are classified as generalists (specialists) if 
their General Ability Index is above (below) the sample median in each year. This analysis is 
based on 683 CEO turnovers during our sample period, where CEO turnover is defined as any 
change in the person identified as the CEO between year t – 1 and year t. The regression 
includes the same set of control variables, but all in (contemporaneous) changes, and industry 
and year effects as in our baseline specification. We use two variables to measure the switch 
of CEO type. Specialist to generalist (Generalist to specialist) is a dummy that equals one if a 
specialist (generalist) CEO at year t - 1 is replaced by a generalist (specialist) CEO at year t, 
and zero otherwise. The holdout group in this specification consists of cases with no CEO type 
change. The results show that the coefficient on Specialist to generalist is negative and 
statistically significant and that of Generalist to specialist is positive and significant. Moreover, 
these two coefficients are statistically different from each other as shown by the F-statistic at 
the bottom of the panel. These findings are consistent with our main hypothesis: an increase 
(decrease) in CSR rating occurs when a generalist (specialist) is replaced by a specialist 
(generalist), consistent with general ability reducing managers’ incentives to engage in CSR 
activity. 
Second, we use alternative measurements of CSR. The variable CSR Net is defined 
simply as the sum of all strength items minus the sum of all concern items, following Borghesi 
et al. (2014), Kang (2016), and McCarthy et al. (2017). Moreover, Tang et al. (2015) and Choi 
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and Wang (2009) indicate that some CSR categories in the KLD database are less relevant to 
stakeholders. We therefore adjust our CSR measures by focusing on the five main categories, 
including community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product quality, for both 
the CSR variable used in our baseline specification and CSR Net. The resulting measures are 
denoted CSR_Five and CSR Net_Five, respectively. Panel B of Table 8 presents the regression 
results using the above alternative CSR measures. For brevity, for each regression, we report 
only the coefficient of the main variable of interest, namely, General Ability Index or General 
Ability Index_dummy, while the same set of controls and industry and year fixed effects as in 
our baseline specification are included. We find that the coefficient of the general ability 
variable is negative and statistically significant at least at the 5% level across all specifications, 
suggesting that our results are robust to alternative ways of measuring CSR. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Third, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) argue that investment in research and development 
(R&D) could result in both CSR-related process and product innovations, which are each 
valued by some consumers. To account for any potential impact of a firm’s R&D activity on 
its CSR performance, we include R&D expenditure (scaled by total assets) as an additional 
control. The results reported in Panel C of Table 8 are materially unaffected by this inclusion. 
Fourth, an alternative explanation of our baseline results is that firms managed by 
generalist CEOs have higher cost of capital (Mishra, 2014), making it more costly for them to 
invest in CSR. To ensure that this explanation does not drive our findings, in Panel C of Table 
8, we include Cost of capital, constructed following Dhaliwal et al. (2011), as an additional 
control.13 Our results remain qualitatively similar.  
 
13 Following Dhaliwal et al. (2011), cost of equity capital is calculated as the mean value of three cost of equity capital measures 
developed by Gebhardt et al. (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Easton (2004), respectively.  
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Fifth, previous literature shows that executive compensation arrangements play an 
important role in determining CSR activity (McGuire et al., 2003; Deckop et al., 2006; Fabrizi 
et al., 2014) and that generalist CEOs earn higher pay than their specialist counterparts, 
reflecting the relative importance of general managerial skills in the labor market (Custódio et 
al., 2013). To mitigate the concern that executive compensation is an omitted factor in our 
model, we include the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation to account for the level of 
executive compensation. In an alternative specification, we include the natural logarithm of 
one plus CEO delta (i.e., the dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s 
stock price) and the natural logarithm of one plus CEO vega (i.e., the dollar change in wealth 
associated with a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the firm’s returns) to account for 
managerial performance and risk-taking incentives, respectively. 14  Panel C shows that 
controlling for these executive compensation variables does not have a large impact on the 
effect of general managerial skills. 
Sixth, McCarthy et al. (2017) find a negative relation between CSR and CEO confidence. 
Following Campbell et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we use the average moneyness 
of a CEO’s stock options to capture the CEO’s confidence beliefs. Specifically, CEO 
confidence is a measure of the extent to which stock price exceeds the exercise price, with 
higher values indicating greater confidence.15 Controlling for CEO confidence, we find in 
Panel C of Table 8 that the coefficients of the two general managerial ability variables remain 
negative and statistically significant. 
 
14 Data on CEO total compensation are sourced from Execucomp and data on CEO delta and CEO vega can be downloaded 
directly from https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/. 
15 We estimate the average CEO stock option moneyness for each year as follows. First, we calculate the average realizable 
value per option by dividing the total realizable value of exercisable options by the number of exercisable options. We then 
subtract the average realizable value from the fiscal year-end stock price to obtain the average exercise price of the options. 
Finally, the estimated moneyness of the options is calculated as the stock price divided by the estimated average exercise price 
minus one.  
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Finally, we also test whether the results are robust to the use of alternative clustering and 
definitions of industry dummies. The results are shown in Panel D of Table 8. We confirm that 
our results are robust to clustering by year and industry, to using two-digit SIC industry 




We document a significant negative relation between general managerial skills and CSR 
activity. The more general managerial skills acquired by the CEO, the less CSR activity 
undertaken by the firm. This finding is robust to alternative CSR measures, empirical 
specifications, methods of clustering, and definitions of industry dummies. To mitigate 
endogeneity concerns, we employ both propensity score matching and instrumental variables 
approaches and confirm that the effect of general managerial ability on CSR still holds in these 
tests. Finally, supplementary test results suggest that the negative relation between the general 
ability index and CSR is more pronounced in tight labor markets and in firms with more short-
term investors, consistent with the idea that the broader set of outside options available to 
generalist CEOs acts as a labor market mechanism that makes them less concerned about the 
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This table presents the number of observations and the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum for each variable. The sample consists of 10，750 firm-year observations between 1996 and 2012. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Variable  Obs.  Mean Median St.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
CSR 10,750 -0.213 -0.200 0.646 -3.250 7.167 
General Ability Index 10,750 0.043 -0.129 0.984 -1.847 7.230 
CEO age 10,750 55.290 56.000 7.468 32.000 94.000 
CEO tenure  10,750 8.010 6.000 7.296 1.000 60.000 
CEO gender  10,750 0.019 0.000 0.138 0.000 1.000 
CEO duality  10,750 0.664 1.000 0.472 0.000 1.000 
CEO MBA 10,750 0.332 0.000 0.471 0.000 1.000 
CEO Ivy league  10,750 0.188 0.000 0.391 0.000 1.000 
CEO military  10,750 0.069 0.000 0.254 0.000 1.000 
CEO fast track  10,750 46.291 47.000 7.571 19.000 72.000 
Sales ($ millions) 10,750 6388.2 1841.0 13048.1 71.5 89131.0 
ROA 10,750 0.137 0.130 0.088 -0.117 0.420 
Stock return  10,750 0.135 0.097 0.439 -0.728 2.020 
Leverage  10,750 0.213 0.205 0.166 0.000 0.812 
Tobin's Q 10,750 1.946 1.531 1.218 0.820 7.776 
Asset tangibility  10,750 0.269 0.203 0.229 0.001 0.878 
Firm age 10,750 27.148 21.000 19.882 1.000 84.000 
Board independence  10,750 0.719 0.750 0.160 0.000 1.000 
Board busyness 10,750 0.271 0.222 0.246 0.000 1.000 
















This table presents the univariate analysis results for firm and CEO characteristics. Panel A compares the 
characteristics of firms run by generalist CEOs and those by specialist CEOs at the firm-year level. We classify 
CEOs with a general ability index above the yearly median as generalists and those with an index below the yearly 
median as specialists. Panel B compares the personal characteristics of generalist CEOs and those of specialist 
CEOs at the CEO level. There are 2744 unique CEOs in our sample. For each CEO, we calculate an average 
general ability index across all years in the sample. We then classify them into the generalist and specialist groups 
based on the median of the average general ability index. The personal characteristic variables are aggregated to 
the CEO level by taking averages over years before conducting the univariate analysis. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to test for differences in the means 
(medians). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Univariate analysis of firm characteristics at the firm-year level 
Variable  
Generalist CEOs 
N = 5477 
Specialist CEOs 
N = 5273 
Test of difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CSR -0.246 -0.209 -0.179 -0.164  -0.067***  -0.045*** 
Sales ($ millions) 8382.6 2512.0 4316.6 1379.4 4066.0*** 1132.6*** 
ROA 0.136 0.129 0.137 0.132   -0.001   -0.003 
Stock return  0.129 0.095 0.141 0.098   -0.012*   -0.003 
Leverage  0.229 0.224 0.197 0.185    0.032*** 0.039*** 
Tobin's Q 1.933 1.528 1.960 1.534   -0.027   -0.006 
Asset tangibility  0.276 0.212 0.263 0.191 0.013*** 0.021*** 
Firm age 29.178 23.000 25.038 20.000 4.140*** 3.000*** 
Board independence  0.738 0.778 0.699 0.714 0.039*** 0.064*** 
Board busyness 0.317 0.286 0.223 0.167 0.094*** 0.119*** 
Institutional ownership  0.772 0.794 0.751 0.771 0.021*** 0.023*** 
Panel B. Univariate analysis of CEO characteristics at the CEO level 
Variable  
Generalist CEOs 
N = 1235 
Specialist CEOs 
N = 1509 
Test of difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CEO age 56.020 56.000 54.510 54.600 1.510*** 1.400*** 
CEO tenure  5.863 4.000 8.003 5.000  -2.141***  -1.000*** 
CEO gender  0.032 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.013** 0.000** 
CEO duality  0.665 1.000 0.599 1.000  0.066***   0.000*** 
CEO MBA 0.381 0.000 0.287 0.000  0.094***  0.000*** 
CEO Ivy league  0.227 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.084*** 0.000*** 
CEO military  0.089 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.039*** 0.000*** 




















General managerial ability and CSR 
 
This table examines the effect of General Ability Index on CSR. General Ability Index_dummy is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a firm’s General Ability Index is above the yearly median and zero otherwise. Panel A 
presents OLS regression results and Panel B presents regression results using alternative modelling techniques. 
Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama–French 49-industry classification. Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix. Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity-robust firm-clustered standard 
errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. OLS regression results 
Variable 
Dependent variable: CSR 
(1) (2) 
General Ability Indext-1     -0.035*** ― 
(0.011)  
General Ability Index_dummyt-1 ―  -0.059*** 
 (0.022)    
CEO aget-1 -0.001 -0.001  
(0.002) (0.002)    
CEO tenuret-1 -0.003 -0.003  
(0.002) (0.002)    
CEO gendert-1 0.529*** 0.509*** 
(0.081) (0.081)    
CEO dualityt-1 0.023 0.023 
(0.023) (0.023)    
CEO MBAt-1 0.028 0.033    
(0.025) (0.025)    
CEO Ivy leaguet-1 0.066** 0.063**  
(0.029) (0.029)    
CEO militaryt-1 0.034 0.030    
(0.047) (0.048)    
CEO fast trackt-1 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002)    
Ln(Sales)t-1 0.052 0.038 
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(0.032) (0.031)    
ROAt-1 0.632*** 0.600*** 
(0.157) (0.156)    
Stock returnt-1 -0.011 -0.021 
(0.014) (0.014)    
Leveraget-1 -0.033 0.040 
(0.080) (0.082)    
Tobin's Qt-1 -0.005 0.004 
(0.011) (0.011)    
Asset tangibilityt-1 -0.165** -0.292*** 
(0.067) (0.067)    
Firm aget-1 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Board independencet-1  0.172*** 0.126*** 
(0.062) (0.061)    
Board busynesst-1 0.066 0.063 
(0.043) (0.043)    
Institutional ownershipt-1   -0.187**  -0.248*** 
(0.073) (0.076)    
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
N 10,750 10,750 


















Panel B. Alternative modelling techniques 
 Dependent variable: CSR 
 Firm FE Firm FE CEO FE CEO FE Fama-MacBeth  Fama-MacBeth  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
General Ability Index      -0.027** ―   -0.040* ―  -0.061** ― 
(0.014)  (0.022)  (0.030)  
General Ability Index_dummy ―    -0.054** ―    -0.078** ―  -0.203** 
 (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.099) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
N 10,750 10,750 10,750 10,750 10,750 10,750 







Propensity score matching estimates 
 
Table 4 presents the propensity score matching estimation results. Panel A reports the parameter estimates from the 
logit model used to estimate the propensity scores. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for the presence of 
generalist CEOs in a firm for a given year. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. Industry effects are 
constructed based on the Fama–French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroscedasticity-robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Panel B shows the univariate 
comparisons of firm characteristics between firms with and without generalist CEOs and the corresponding t-statistics. 
Panel C shows the average treatment effect estimates. The variable CSR is the rating of corporate social responsibilities. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Pre-match propensity score regression and post-match diagnostic regression  
 Dependent variable:                                                   
Dummy equals 1 for firms run by generalist CEOs and 0 otherwise 
Variables   Pre-match   Post-match 
CEO age  0.059***  0.006 
 (0.012)  (0.011) 
CEO tenure   -0.063***  -0.004 
 (0.012)  (0.011) 
CEO gender   0.800***  0.115 
 (0.296)  (0.315) 
CEO duality   0.147  -0.035 
 (0.107)  (0.109) 
CEO MBA  0.332***  0.027 
 (0.107)  (0.111) 
CEO Ivy league   0.451***  0.016 
 (0.136)  (0.142) 
CEO military   0.325*  -0.047 
 (0.184)  (0.201) 
CEO fast track   -0.015  -0.007 
 (0.011)  (0.010) 
Ln(Sales)  0.610***  -0.015 
 (0.095)  (0.099) 
ROA  -0.594  0.144 
 (0.555)  (0.583) 
Stock return   -0.062  0.013 
 (0.051)  (0.057) 
Leverage   0.272  0.059 
 (0.302)  (0.314) 
Tobin's Q  0.071*  -0.014 
 (0.043)  (0.044) 
Asset tangibility  -0.301  -0.022 
 (0.267)  (0.281) 
Firm age  -0.005*  0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Board independence   0.801***  -0.015 
 (0.260)  (0.274) 
Board busyness  0.916***  -0.026 
 (0.171)  (0.174) 
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Institutional ownership   1.299***  -0.062 
 (0.254)  (0.271) 
Industry effects   Yes   Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes 
N  10,750  7,174 
Pseudo-R2   0.118   0.002 
Panel B. Differences in CEO and firm characteristics  
Variables 
Firm-year obs.         
with generalist CEOs    
(N=3587) 
Firm-year obs.         
with specialist CEOs    
(N=3587) 
Difference t-stat 
CEO age  55.195 55.149 0.046 0.278 
CEO tenure  7.561 7.546 0.015 0.094 
CEO gender 0.020 0.017 0.003 0.907 
CEO duality  0.652 0.663 -0.011 -0.947 
CEO MBA 0.340 0.329 0.011 0.975 
CEO Ivy league 0.174 0.170 0.004 0.453 
CEO military 0.060 0.062 -0.002 -0.412 
CEO fast track  46.543 46.629 -0.086 -0.489 
Ln(Sales) 6.293 6.297 -0.004 -0.286 
ROA 0.139 0.138 0.001 0.369 
Stock return  0.139 0.137 0.002 0.223 
Leverage 0.212 0.211 0.001 0.276 
Tobin's Q 1.958 1.964 -0.006 -0.209 
Asset tangibility 0.266 0.269 -0.003 -0.487 
Firm age 26.863 27.000 -0.137 -0.292 
Board independence 0.721 0.722 -0.001 -0.066 
Board busyness 0.266 0.269 -0.003 -0.474 
Institutional ownership  0.772 0.770 0.002 0.567 
Panel C. Propensity score matching estimate  
Variables 
Firm-year obs.         
with generalist CEOs    
(N=3587) 
Firm-year obs.         
with specialist CEOs    
(N=3587) 
Difference t-stat 























Instrumental variables estimates 
 
This table presents estimates of the instrumental variables method using two-stage least square (2SLS) panel 
regression. The dependent variable is General Ability Index for the first-stage regression and CSR for the second-stage 
regression. The instrumental variable is Recession depth. Following Schoar and Zuo (2017), we identify whether there 
was a recession in the year when the CEO started his or her career, based on the NBER business cycle dating database. 
The variable Recession depth is then defined as the number of months the recession lasted if there was a recession and 
zero otherwise. The other control variables are the same as in column (3) of Table 3. For the sake of brevity, we report 
only the coefficients of the main variables of interest. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Industry effects are 
constructed based on the Fama–French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroscedasticity-robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Dependent variable:                         
General Ability Index 
Dependent variable:                              
CSR 
Variables  First Stage                           
(1) 
Second stage                    
(2) 
Recession depth      -0.015*** ― 
(0.004)  
General Ability Indext-1 ―  -0.553** 
  (0.258) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
N 10,750 10,750 














Effect of local labor market tightness 
 
This table examines whether the relation between general managerial skills and CSR activity is affected by the 
tightness of the local labor market. We measure the tightness of the local labor market by the state-level unemployment 
rate obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We then split the sample into high- and low-tightness groups based 
on the state-level unemployment rates. A state is in the high-tightness (low-tightness) group if it has an unemployment 
rate that is below (above) the sample median across all states in a given year. The p-value row presents the p-values 
of the test that the coefficients in the high and low columns are equal. Industry effects are constructed based on the 
Fama–French 49-industry classification. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Statistical significance is 
based on the heteroscedasticity-robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variables 
OLS regressions                                    





General ability indext-1      -0.049**  -0.014 
(0.020) (0.012) 
Controls  Yes Yes 
Industry effects  Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
p-value 0.067 0.067 
N 6,492 4,258 












Effect of the investor horizon 
 
This table examines whether the relation between general managerial skills and CSR activity is affected by the investor 
horizon, Investor turnover. The Investor turnover value of a firm is the average turnover of its investors’ entire 
portfolios, with higher values indicating shorter horizons. We split the sample into high- and low-turnover groups 
based on the sample median of Investor turnover. The p-value row presents the p-values of the test that the coefficients 
in the high and low columns are equal. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama–French 49-industry 
classification. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroscedasticity-robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variables  
OLS regressions                                                
Dependent variable: CSR                                             
High investor turnover                          
(1) 
Low investor turnover                          
(2) 
GAI Ability Indext-1 
 -0.039**  -0.011 
(0.017) (0.014) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
p-value  0.074 0.074 
N 5,702 5,048 


















This table contains a number of checks testing the robustness of the relation between general managerial skills and 
CSR to alternative CSR measures, model specifications, clustering, and definitions of industry dummies. We include 
the same set of control variables and industry and year fixed effects as in our baseline regressions. For brevity, we 
report only the coefficients of the general managerial ability variables, unless otherwise specified. The p-value row 
presents the p-value of the test that the coefficients of Specialist to generalist and Generalist to specialist are equal.  
Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity-robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
OLS regressions                                    
Dependent variable: ∆CSR 
Panel A: Switch of CEO type (N=683) 
Specialist to generalist  
     -0.181*** 
 (0.031) 
Generalist to specialist  
  0.038* 
 (0.021) 
F-test: Specialist to generalist vs. Generalist to specialist   36.70*** 
  
OLS regressions                                    
Dependent variable: CSR 
  
General Ability               
Index               
(1) 
General Ability               
Index_dummy              
(2) 
Panel B: Alternative measures of CSR  
CSR_Net 
  -0.168***   -0.276*** 
(0.058) (0.103) 
CSR_Five 
 -0.024**  -0.045** 
(0.011) (0.019) 
CSR_Net_Five 
 -0.113**  -0.195** 
(0.054) (0.094) 
Panel C: Alternative model specifications 
Controlling for R&D expenditure/TA 
    -0.036***     -0.068*** 
(0.012) (0.022) 
Controlling for Cost of capital  
   -0.034***     -0.061*** 
(0.012) (0.023) 
Controlling for ln(CEO total compensation) 
 -0.025**  -0.047** 
(0.012) (0.022) 
Controlling for ln(1+CEO delta) and ln(1+CEO vega) 
 -0.036***      -0.068*** 
(0.013) (0.022) 
Controlling for CEO confidence  
  -0.033***  -0.059*** 
(0.012) (0.022) 
Panel D: Alternative clustering and definitions of industry dummies  
Clustering by year 
    -0.033***     -0.059*** 
(0.008) (0.013) 
Clustering by industry 
 -0.035**     -0.057** 
(0.017) (0.026) 
Two-digit SIC industry dummies  
 -0.033**  -0.060** 
(0.016) (0.028) 
Three-digit NAICS industry dummies  









Variable  Description  Source  
Panel A: Main variables  
CSR Modified CSR score constructed following Deng et al. (2013) and Lins et al. (2017). KLD 
General Ability Index  Index of general managerial ability developed by Custódio et al. (2013) that incorporates five 
aspects of a CEO’s lifetime career experience, including the past number of (i) positions, (ii) 
firms, and (iii) industries in which the CEO worked; (iv) whether the CEO held a CEO position at 
a different company; and (v) whether the CEO worked for a conglomerate firm. The index is the 
first factor of the principal component analysis of the five proxies. 
BoardEx 
General Ability Index_dummy Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO has a general ability index that is above 
the yearly median and zero otherwise.  
BoardEx 
   
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Ln(Sales)  Natural logarithm of firm sales. Compustat 
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, divided by total assets. Compustat 
Stock return  Firm’s stock return over the past year.  CRSP 
Leverage Sum of short- and long-term debt, divided by total assets.  Compustat 
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity, all 
divided by total assets, where the market value of equity is the year-end closing price times the 
number of shares outstanding.  
Compustat 
Asset tangibility Total value of property, plant, and equipment, divided by total assets.  Compustat 
Firm age Number of years since the firm listed its shares.  CRSP  
 
Panel C: Corporate governance characteristics 
Board independence  The fraction of independent directors on the board.  IRRC/RiskMetrics 
Board busyness The fraction of independent directors with multiple directorships on the board.  IRRC/RiskMetrics 
Institutional ownership The number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the number of shares outstanding.  Thomson 




Panel D: CEO characteristics  
CEO age Age of CEO in years.  BoardEx 
CEO tenure Number of years as CEO in the current position.  BoardEx 
CEO gender Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO is female and zero otherwise.  BoardEx 
CEO duality Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO is also the chair of the board and zero otherwise.  BoardEx 
CEO MBA Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO has an MBA and zero otherwise.  BoardEx 
CEO Ivy league Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO attended an Ivy League university (i.e., Brown 
University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, 
Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University) at any academic level and 
zero otherwise.  
BoardEx 
CEO military A dummy variable that equals one if a CEO has military experience and zero otherwise.  BoardEx 
CEO fast track Age at which a CEO became CEO for the first time.  BoardEx    
 
Panel E: Variables used in further analysis and robustness tests 
Specialist to generalist  Dummy variable that equals one if there is a specialist CEO at year t-1 replaced by a generalist 
CEO at year t.  
BoardEx 
Generalist to specialist  Dummy variable that equals one if there is a generalist CEO at year t-1 replaced by a specialist 
CEO at year t.  
BoardEx 
CSR Net The sum value of a score form the total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns.  KLD 
CSR_Five Modified CSR score constructed following Deng et al. (2013) and Lins et al. (2017), which 
includes community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product quality.  
KLD 
CSR Net_Five The sum value of a score form the total number of strengths minus the total number of concerns, 
which includes community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product quality.  
KLD 
R&D expenditure/TA Expenditures on R&D divided by total assets.  Compustat 
Cost of capital  Following Dhaliwal et al. (2011), the cost of capital is calculated as the mean value of the three 
cost of capital measures developed by Gebhardt et al. (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and 
Easton (2004), respectively. 
I/B/E/S, Compustat 
Ln(CEO total compensation) The natural logrithm value of CEO total compensation, which consists of salary, bonus, value of 
restricted stock granted, value of options granted, long-term incentive payout, and other 
compensation.  
EXECUCOMP 
Ln(1+CEO delta) The natural logrithm value of one plus CEO delta, which is the dollar change in wealth associated 
with a 1% change in the firm's stock price.  
Personal website of 
Lalitha Naveen 
Ln(1+CEO vega) The natural logrithm value of one plus CEO vega, which is the dollar change in wealth associated 
with a 1% change in the standard deviation of the firm's returns.  




CEO confidence   A measure of the extent to which stock price exceeds the exercise price. Following Campbell et 
al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we first calculate the average realizable value per option 
by dividing the total realizable value of exercisable options by the number of exercisable options. 
We then subtract the average realizable value from the fiscal year-end stock price to obtain the 
average exercise price of the options. Finally, the estimated moneyness of the options is calculated 












































Supporting Documentation for Manuscript 
“General managerial skills and corporate social responsibility” 
 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 











































Effect of the CEOs’ outside options 
 
This table examines whether the relation between general managerial skills and CSR activity is affected by the 
value of the CEO’s outside options. Following Custódio et al. (2017) and Kedia and Rajgopal (2009), we use two 
measures of labor market conditions to capture the variation in the value of outside options. The first measure is 
the tightness of the local labor market.We measure the tightness of the local labor market by the state-level 
unemployment rate obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The second measure is the local beta, which 
shows the degree of co-movement between a firm’s stock return and stock returns of other firms that are in the 
same region. In columns (1) and (2), we split the sample into high- and low-tightness groups based on the state-
level unemployment rates. A state is in the high-tightness (low-tightness) group if it has an unemployment rate 
that is below (above) the sample median across all states in a given year. In columns (3) and (4), we calculate the 
local beta following Kedia and Rajgopal (2009) and split the sample into high- and low-local beta firms. A firm 
is classified to have a high (low) local beta if its beta is above (below) the median value of beta of other firms in 
the same state in a given year. The p-value row presents the p-values of the test that the coefficients in the high 
and low columns are equal. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama–French 49-industry classification. 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity-robust 
firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 OLS regressions 
 Dependent variable: CSR 
 High local beta                  
(1) 
Low local beta              
(2) 
GAI Ability Indext-1 
   -0.053**  -0.021* 
(0.022) (0.013) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
p-value  0.182 0.182 
N 5,389 4,453 
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.083 
 
